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NOTES FOR DDCI

7 May 1964

1. At this week's meeting of the Country Team in Saigon, Lodge raised the same question he did a few days ago with Khanh; namely, is there a possibility of some catastrophic development such as Dien Bien Phu which could take us all by surprise and ring down the curtain in South Vietnam? [REDACTED] thought the possibility extremely remote. He characterized the war as "43 separate wars in 43 separate provinces", none of which is large enough to be a catastrophe by itself. Westmoreland, however, thought that NVN might well build sizable forces just north of the DMZ or along Route 9 in Laos and move quickly to take over the northern tier of provinces in SVN in the event of another coup.

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2. As you requested, sometime in the next few days, another gray phone will be installed, this one at Barbara's desk. It will ring at Barbara rather than in your ear and she will be able to monitor calls at your request.

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3. I am concerned about the manner in which you so frequently become the brunt of DCI's criticism when components within the Agency begin to quibble over an NIE at a pre-USIB meeting. As you know, Sherman Kent always provides a brief memo which tells how State, DIA and others have been reacting to the NIE in question but what has been lacking is a DD/I memo to you which alerts you to any differences of opinion within the Agency. I have asked the DD/I office to develop procedures to button this up.

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4. FE Division emitted howls of anguish at the prospect of inviting MACV officers to tour [REDACTED] Their position is simple and direct given current emotions over [REDACTED] programs. Even a tour could create the impression that we were inviting a more direct military role. Furthermore, MACV officers should be too busy in SVN to take the time for a trip. In addition,

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
[REDACTED] FE will, of course, subside if you overrule them, but I suggest that you not press the matter now.

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
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5. As I told you the other day, I still find it very difficult in my own mind (and I think this is true of most others in the Agency as well) to determine or define what really constitutes a security breach or a damaging revelation in a book like "The Invisible Government." We all agree that such books are terrible and damaging but we don't have any professional definition of what it is that makes them so. Even if we did have this definition, one then has to be in a position to argue the case against the lofty belief that "the American public has the right to be informed." I think it would be a good idea to ask some bright young fellow who will be going to one of the war colleges to work on this subject as a thesis. There wouldn't be any harm in this and we might all learn something.



H. Knoche

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